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In July and August of 1990, the Federated States of Micronesia held its
second constitutional convention. Assessing the outcome of that conven-
tion is no simple matter. Only four amendments, relatively minor in
scope, were ultimately approved by the nation's voters, and it appears to
many observers that the convention had no impact whatsoever. There is
virtually no official record of its proceedings. 1 On the other hand, dele-
gates to the convention proposed 104 amendments, most of them intended
to bring about sweeping changes in the nature of the government. This
massive attempt to shape a new government was thwarted for largely the
same reasons it was mounted-a series of structural and ethnic tensions
among the states and between the states and the national government.
Although the convention appears to have accomplished little, it can
nevertheless be reckoned a turning point in Micronesian affairs. All who
participated in it know that there is at this time very little likelihood of the
four FSM states resolving these tensions collectively. Henceforth, each
state will probably be making its own preparations for the end of the fif-
teen-year Compact of Free Association with the United States, which
expires in 2001. If the Micronesian federation does eventually splinter (as
seems likely), the apparently fruitless convention of 1990 will stand out as
an augury of what has gone wrong. This essay tells that story.
Some people argue that any trend toward disintegration in the Federa-
ted States of Micronesia is the consequence of a failure of effort and good-
will, and that the nation's leaders must be held directly accountable for
their unwillingness to shape a nation in the melting-pot image of the
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United States. I do not agree. As we are now seeing nearly everywhere, the
remnant political forms of disintegrating old empires are simply not
appropriate for peoples who view themselves as possessing rights to put
their own political traditions into practice; they choose not to be saddled
with alien and irrelevant models imposed from elsewhere. Multiethnic
states are laudable achievements when they treat all members equally, but
achieving such equality is a rare accomplishment. The groundswell of
interest in dismantling postcolonial nation-states is not merely a response
to perceived inequalities, but a positive affirmation of peoples' rights to
govern themselves according to their own political principles. The possi-
bility of continued fragmentation in Micronesia cannot be presumed a
failure of will (though such failures have occurred) so much as a fairly rea-
sonable response to historical circumstance.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The term Micronesian tends to be interpreted as implying a degree of
homogeneity. The old United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
comprised a set of islands, however, whose populations have little more in
common than do the peoples called Melanesian. Micronesia is, in David
Hanlon's word (1989), a "nonentity," no more than a convenient rubric for
a place long under the rule of one or two colonial powers. Through a pro-
cess of exfoliation, the term has in some venues come to denote the
Federated States of Micronesia, but that nation has no greater historical
claim to the term than do Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, or any of the
other entities carved out of this obsolete ethno-cartographical category. 2
Within the country, people tend to speak of themselves in terms of their
island of origin (when they classify themselves at all), not as Microne-
sians. The processes that split apart the Trust Territory are likely to have
the same effect here. A brief summary of the historical events that have
shaped the area's contemporary polities is in order.
The mid-nineteenth century growth of whaling, trading, and mission-
ary activities introduced the peoples of most of these islands to European
interests well before they were claimed as colonial territories. By the later
part of the nineteenth century, however, competing German, Spanish, and
British claims in the western Pacific (along with some long-standing Amer-
ican interests) led to the imposition of colonial rule. The British took the
Gilbert Islands, Germany claimed the Marshall Islands, and the remainder
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went to Spain. American conflicts with Spain caused some rearrangements
at the end of the century: the United States took Guam, and Germany
assumed control of the rest of the islands north of the equator. The US
Navy was not entirely happy with this arrangement, which it saw as leav-
ing the Philippines vulnerable to attack, and it began laying plans for con-
quest of the islands-known as War Plan Orange-almost immediately.
The Japanese invaded the German-held islands at the outset of World War
One and subsequently were granted control of them as a League of
Nations Mandate. Following some of World War Two's fiercest battles,
the United States occupied the area, completing a long, slow process of
penetration that had begun with the arrival of American missionaries in
the 1850S and was abetted by American turn-of-the-century war plans.
After considerable debate, the US government decided to forgo outright
annexation of the area and instead claimed it as a United Nations Strate-
gic Trusteeship, the only one of its kind. In the next two decades, the
United States undertook little in the way of economic development, but
did promote the creation of a series of American-style political institutions
culminating in the Congress of Micronesia, which first met in 1965. In
response to the worldwide wave of decolonization, the United States came
to see that its hold on the islands was ideologically, if not militarily, pre-
carious and sought a diplomatically acceptable means of gaining perma-
nent control. Members of the newly established Congress of Micronesia
were not so sure that their peoples' best interests lay in permanent Ameri-
can overlordship, and began a series of negotiations that remains unfin-
ished today, nearly thirty years later. Although the Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federa-
ted States of Micronesia have all entered into agreements with the United
States, the last two compacts are of limited duration, and the Marianas
government is not content with current American interpretations of their
agreement. Belau remains under the administration of the old Trust Terri-
tory, trapped in a surreal time warp, voting again and again in a vain
attempt to approve impossible terms demanded by the United States.
Dismemberment of the Trust Territory got underway in the mid-1970S,
as the United States began to see that its interests in expanding militarily
in the islands would best be served by negotiating with individual "dis-
tricts"-the old administrative units that now constitute either separate
political entities or the FSM states. In 1975, perhaps in order to provoke a
showdown of sorts, the Trust Territory administration organized a consti-
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tutional convention and a referendum on future political status that was
intended to advise the convention's delegates on the wishes of the people.
THE 1975 MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The first constitutional convention took place in a thoroughly confusing
milieu; its history is detailed in Norman Meller's Constitutionalism in
Micronesia (1985). The Marianas had voted just a month earlier in favor
of the covenant that would eventually make them a US commonwealth.
Only a few delegates showed up from the Marianas, and their status was
uncertain. Meanwhile, a movement to begin separate political-status talks
had begun in the Marshalls, accompanied by a partial boycott of the con-
vention. The status of the Marshallese delegates elected under these cir-
cumstances was likewise in doubt. The Palauans were also considering
separate negotiations, and their delegates made it clear that they were pre-
pared to quit the convention unless the constitution was written to their
exact specifications. Though their delegation remained to the end, Palau's
voters, like those in the Marshall Islands, did not approve the completed
document in the ratifying referendum of 1978. The four districts that did
ratify the constitution, Kosrae, Pohnpei, Yap, and Chuuk, became the
four states of the Federated States of Micronesia. 3
This history is critical to an understanding of the 1990 Constitutional
Convention, both because of a widespread sentiment that the original
constitution had been drafted in response to demands of the Palauans and
the Marshallese, who did not become part of the federation, and because
the constitution was drafted before the Compact of Free Association with
the United States had been agreed on, signed, ratified, and implemented. 4
An item in the original constitution requires that the people be asked,
every ten years, if they wish to have a constitutional convention called.
Thus in 1989, ten years after the Federated States first began governing
itself, the voters approved the constitutional convention that was con-
vened in the following year.
As the 1990 Constitutional Convention got underway, the key issue del-
egates would have to grapple with appeared to be the very nature of their
national government. At the time of the 1975 Constitutional Convention,
the character of Micronesia's future political relationship with the United
States was still uncertain and had posed a fundamental problem for its del-
egates. They were unable to make a clearly articulated choice between a
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strongly centralized, unitary national government and a decentralized,
confederal system with most power lodged in the constituent states. The
impasse was resolved by an ad hoc division of powers among the national
and state governments (Meller 1985, 242-245). In retrospect, though this
was not entirely clear at the time, some of the delegates' hesitancy may
have arisen from a troublesome uncertainty over the nature of the status
agreement(s) still pending with the United States. It is difficult to assign
powers within a government when no one has a clear sense of what that
government's powers are likely to be.
THE ISSUES AT THE 1990 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Federated States of Micronesia was established in 1979 and gradually
began taking over the various functions of the Trust Territory administra-
tion. The national government soon found that in order to ensure the
uninterrupted flow of the compact funding from the United States it had
to undertake careful, centralized control of the funds. This gave it far
more power over every aspect of the country's fiscal life than had been
envisioned by most of those who framed the constitution. The issue of the
central government's powers was at the core of the problems delegates
hoped to address at the 1990 Constitutional Convention. One of the con-
vention's most telling observations came from a Yapese delegate, Aloysius
Tuuth, who at the time was also the nation's secretary of finance. Com-
menting on tensions between state and national governments over man-
agement of health and education, and referring specifically to the states'
desires to end the national government's interference in what were seen as
local prerogatives, Tuuth said, "We want to take the reins. We don't need
two drivers anymore."
The delegates seemed committed to the search for a radical solution to
a shared concern that the national government was far more powerful
than had been intended. On several occasions delegates spoke frankly
about their perceptions. Kosrae's Governor Yosiwo George insisted that
the country was "a loose federation" with its authority vested in the states,
while Leo Falcam, a Pohnpeian who had been a delegate to the 1975 Con-
stitutional Convention as well, articulated a widely shared point of view:
the 1975 Constitution, he said, had been tailored to make the president
and the national government responsible to the states. "It was our con-
scious intent in 1975 to make the national government weak. If this didn't
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work, if things are unbearable, if our people are unhappy, then we should
change things. The President is supposed to be weak. If our system is not
working as we intended it, then we change it."
The ambiguous nature of both the nation's relationship with the United
States and its international status added to the discontent delegates
brought with them to the constitutional convention. Though the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia had been self-governing for eleven years, its
political status had still not been entirely resolved-and remains some-
what ambiguous (as does that of the Marshall Islands), despite United
Nations approval of the free association relationship and the end of the
trusteeship. Although a number of scholars hold that these polities are not
genuinely independent and that their sovereignties are compromised by
the compact (Firth 1989, 79-83; Smith 1991, 94-100), some politically and
legally interested parties are inclined to view them as entirely sovereign,
effectively independent, or both (Michal 1993; Stovall 1991). FSM leaders,
as we shall see, express divided and sometimes ambivalent opinions about
the exact nature of their country's political status, and most Micronesians
believe that the United States retains undue influence over their national
government. General discontent with the power of the FSM Congress,
and the way that Congress exercises it, was bolstered by a sense that the
central government serves at least as much to channel American authority
as to challenge it. In seeking to curb Congressional powers, a substantial
number of delegates (and the people who elected them) were hoping not
simply to shift authority from the central government to the states, but to
minimize the degree of authority the United States wields over their
islands. In asserting that the states no longer needed "two drivers," Yap's
Tuuth was speaking not only of power sharing between the state and
national levels, but also of the contest between the Federated States of
Micronesia and the United States of America.
The fundamental questions facing the delegates had to do not only with
their country's internal political life, but with its external relations. Each
decision had to be analyzed as a possible reorganization of links among
the states, between the states and the national government, between the
nation and the United States, between the states and the United States,
between the national government and foreign powers, and between the
states and foreign powers. For the delegates, the manifold ramifications of
each and every potential change increased the difficulty of achieving
agreement. Although there was remarkable accord over the need for
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changes in relationships between the states and the central government,
there was little agreement on the sorts of changes that should be effected
in relations among the states themselves.
Despite a shared sense that the national government too often served to
channel American influence, the very vagueness of the relationship with
the United States also made delegates hesitate to weaken what was still
their main bulwark against that country. Any change in the national gov-
ernment might curtail its ability to withstand American interference. In
the absence of clear agreement on how to shape internal changes, few del-
egates were willing to risk weakening the national government's position
in that relationship. Nor were they eager to tamper with the central gov-
ernment's role in securing foreign aid from sources other than the United
States. The delegates had to decide both how much power to allow the
national government and how much to transfer to the four states.
The FSM Congress appears to have recognized the potential threat
posed by the constitutional convention. The national population is small
and members of Congress are by no means insulated from the people they
represent; they knew the general mood. When voters were asked whether
they wanted a constitutional convention (on the March 1989 congres-
sional election ballot), 71 percent said yes, sending an unmistakable mes-
sage to their leaders. In response, Congress, which drafted the legislation
establishing the convention, set a number of hurdles in its path.
Although it required the convention to meet in the nation's capital on
Pohnpei, Congress refused to allow the delegates use of its own chamber,
which was clearly the most convenient site for the convention. After con-
siderable political maneuvering, which included a tentative decision to use
the Pohnpei State Legislature's smaller, sparsely equipped chamber, Con-
gress was essentially embarrassed into providing its facilities. The conven-
tion's funding allocation stipulated that it was to run for 30 days, with a
maximum extension of 15 days, for a 45-day total. This may not at first
glance seem problematic, but the amount of time allotted did not allow
for this being the first time most of the delegates had worked together.
And, unlike 1975, there was no preconvention workshop providing the
delegates with an opportunity to achieve at least an initial degree of cohe-
sion. At the level of funding made available, it was necessary to run the
convention entirely on an in-house basis, using legal staff from the
national and state governments.
Most significant, Congress required that amendments be approved by
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consensus-that is, by all four state delegations-on second reading. This
requirement nearly caused a still-birth. The first item of business was to
change the rules legislated by Congress, lowering the consensus require-
ment to a three-fourths majority. This in turn stirred up Kosrae, which
had insisted on consensus during the congressional hearings that preceded
the convention. Having revised their rules, the delegates then asked the
FSM Supreme Court to uphold their right to do so. By the time legal briefs
had been exchanged between the constitutional convention and the FSM
executive branch, amicus curiae arguments from Kosrae and the Congress
filed, oral arguments heard, and the court had reached a decision-
upholding the convention's right to change its own rules-25 of the ini-
tially allotted 30 days had already passed. Though committee meetings
and public hearings were in full swing during this period, very little had
moved forward on the convention floor; the final days were marred by a
frenzy of work in which a number of items failed to gain approval largely
because of the delegates' confusion and exhaustion. In the end, the con-
sensus issue hardly mattered. The convention's greatest hurdle was the
first reading. Of the 31 delegates' votes, 24 were required for passage;
because of absences, only occasionally were more than 27 votes cast. The
opposition of two or three delegates was often enough to defeat a pro-
posal, and only 24 proposals were ultimately approved.
Though discontent with the central government's powers was the most
visible problem, it soon became evident that the constitutional convention
was in fact going to serve as a forum for the more critical issue of unity
within the federation. Most of the attempts to amend the constitution
foundered on oppositions among the states. As the delegates were about
to vote on the change in the consensus rule, Kosrae's Governor George
delivered a short speech, in which he noted Kosrae's "disappointment and
unhappiness" and remarked that the atmosphere was plagued by "ele-
ments of doubt, elements of fear, elements of mistrust, and elements of
suspicion." Referring to a comment he had made earlier, concerning the
Kosrae delegation's mandate for "sovereign recognition of the states," he
expressed Kosrae's hope that the convention's work would "strengthen the
unity of this nation." Kosrae's hope for unity was couched in its insistence
on state sovereignty and a context of fear and distrust-that is, in barely
disguised disunity.
At about the same time, a Pohnpeian leader, speaking off the record,
explained his people's inclination to leave the Federated States of Micro-
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nesia, a sentiment expressed repeatedly at a series of public hearings con-
vened by the state's convention delegation. "We heard it from everyone.
They gave us many different reasons-and some were perhaps silly-but
they all reached the same conclusion." The main reason for this outlook,
he explained, was land and the fear of permitting non-Pohnpeians access
to it, given the very limited amount left on the island for the Pohnpeians
themselves~ The delegation found itself confronting "a dilemma," he said.
Though the nation's need for stability inclined them to support unity, they
also felt responsible to the people who sent them to the convention. "The
others say unity is necessary. Pohnpei says that if there is no unity after ten
years of nationhood, then it will never come. If we can work something
out, fine; but if there is no agreement, then the die is cast. We are different
peoples, speaking different languages, with different cultures." Pohnpei's
desire for separation, like Kosrae's insistence on state sovereignty, was
charged with a sense that unity was already a lost cause.
In the end, the 1990 Constitutional Convention's underlying theme was
disunity. It was unable to resolve its mandate to shift power from the cen-
tral government to the states because it did not function as a body repre-
senting the Federated States of Micronesia, but rather as four separate
state delegations negotiating among themselves over what was best for
their respective states and not necessarily what was best for their country.
THE DELEGATIONS
Delegates representing the four states came to the constitutional conven-
tion with decidedly differing styles and points of view. The delegations
from the two smallest states, Kosrae (with 4 delegates) and Yap (5), dem-
onstrated a relatively high degree of internal cohesion. The two larger del-
egations, Chuuk (13) and Pohnpei (9), only occasionally achieved unanim-
ity in their deliberations and voting. Kosrae had a clear mandate, and the
Chuuk delegates seemed certain of where their state's interests lay, but the
charges borne by the Yapese and Pohnpeian delegations were either unspe-
cific, as in Yap's case, or somewhat contradictory, as in Pohnpei's.
Kosrae's position was straightforward. The state's leaders had opposed
the convention, and when it was convened they attempted to diminish its
effectiveness by arguing strenuously for the consensus rule giving them a
veto. As representatives of the smallest and most homogeneous state,
Kosr,ae's delegation took the position that any reorganization or redivision
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of power or funding was likely to threaten the principle of state sover-
eignty-that is, that each state's share be equal to that of each of the
others. Kosrae's Governor George was a particularly determined and ar-
ticulate spokesman for this position.
Chuuk's delegation represented a diametrically opposed tendency with-
in the federation. The population of Chuuk State, according to new cen-
sus figures first made available during a hearing at the convention (and
then only unofficially), is greater than that of the other three states com-
bined. 5 The people of Chuuk Lagoon have long been split into eastern and
western factions (the west has consistently pursued status as a separate
FSM state), and outlying atolls in the west, north, and southeast have sig-
nificant differences from, as well as long-standing ties with, the lagoon
population. Large size and diversity of interests promote multiple, contra-
dictory tensions. The Chuuk delegation had a difficult time maintaining
internal cohesion, given the large number of regional factions within their
state.
In general, Chuuk's position was that equitable divisions of power and
funding could only be achieved by allocating them on the basis of popula-
tion. (As one Kosraen summed it up, "When the Chuukese say something
should be done 'democratically,' they mean that Chuuk should have the
power.") But some of Chuuk's delegates recognized the intimidating effect
of this position and worked to defuse it, particularly in the matter of presi-
dential selection, in which several Chuukese delegates deliberately steered
clear of proposals providing for election of the FSM president by a simple
popular vote.
Yap mixes a relatively small population with marked diversity of inter-
ests between the people of Yap island and the peoples of the outlying atolls
(collectively known as the Woleai), who speak variants of a language
closely related to Chuukese but have long been dominated socially by the
Yapese. Located in an area that is as close to Belau, Guam, and the North-
ern Marianas as it is to the rest of the federation, Yap appears less affected
by many of the tensions that concern the others and perhaps for this rea-
son seems more committed to the union. Its delegation came with a series
of proposed changes but did not insist on seeing them adopted. The
Yapese are well known in Micronesia for their willingness to cooperate
with, rather than confront, the other states.
Pohnpei's delegation was possibly the most fractious. Like Chuuk and
Yap, Pohnpei State includes different populations, some indigenous to the
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main island and others to the outlying atolls, as well as a sizable popula-
tion of peoples long resident on the main island who trace their ancestries
and affinities to the atolls. The first bloc is largely fed up with the federa-
tion, while the other two see it as the prime guarantee of their livelihoods.
The Pohnpei State delegation was split by these competing concerns and
manifested little cohesion. Nonetheless, having the capital located on
Pohnpei makes the national government's actions especially visible, and
dislike for the government is perhaps greatest in Pohnpei State. The state's
relatively large population made it a candidate for favoring decisions and
disbursements based on simple population numbers, but its long-standing
interest in seeing an independent Micronesia, in opposition to those who
had chosen free association, inclined it toward support for the state sover-
eignty position. 6 Though Pohnpei's secession amendment played only a
minor role during the constitutional convention, it may well have a highly
significant, long-term impact on the federation's survival.
In the present context, two themes emerge as keys to understanding the
convention's dynamics. First were the basically structural tensions be-
tween Kosrae and Chuuk: the roughly seven thousand Kosraen people
are apprehensive about the political power of the fifty-five thousand
Chuukese. These tensions were largely focused on the issue of political
control. Kosraens insisted on decentralization and state sovereignty-they
wanted the right to make virtually all political, economic, and social deci-
sions on their own-while the Chuukese wanted to ensure that the
national government was responsive to their absolute majority within the
nation. General agreement among all the delegates that the national gov-
ernment-and more specifically, the Congress-had to be weakened and
decentralized was intersected by a competing sense that Chuuk's over-
whelming popular vote and its numerical strength in (some would say
domination of) Congress permitted it to benefit from the status quo.
Even as everyone spoke on behalf of decentralization, Chuuk's delega-
tion was ambivalent, if not equivocal, about changes in the current state
of affairs. At the same time, the other states found themselves confronting
the converse of this issue. By weakening the center, some of them feared,
they would merely unshackle the full power of Chuuk's absolute majority;
even a strong coalition of the other three states could not muster enough
votes to challenge Chuuk's numbers. Despite openly expressed agreement
on the need for change, the delegates were not at all sure that implement-
ing the changes they were calling for would serve them well.
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Second was the matter of enhancing local-state-authority in a num-
ber of contested areas. These included, but were by no means limited to,
the primacy of local custom, local regulation of access to land, and migra-
tion among the states. These items were of considerably more concern to
the Yap and Pohnpei delegations, and only marginally engaged the other
two states. The Yapese introduced a number of measures intended to pro-
tect and preserve local customs, but they eventually decided that any
attempt to legislate in areas of custom and tradition would in the long run
be more likely to harm than sustain them. Pohnpei, on the other hand,
vigorously pursued its quest for state control over migration, judicial pre-
rogatives, and land law. Its delegates introduced a series of proposals
intended to enable Pohnpei to prohibit non-Pohnpeians from owning land
in Pohnpei and to preclude immigration to their state from the other three.
Though a number of Pohnpeians argued trenchantly in favor of these
amendments, the measures were quickly shunted aside. The Kosraens
worked hard, without success, to remove the Constitution's freedom of
religion clause. They had come with vain hopes of establishing their local
Congregational denomination as the state religion, and of keeping other
sects off the island.
Each of the four state delegations brought with it a markedly different
perspective on the nation's future. Convention business was for the most
part conducted by four separate states working on their own agendas;
only occasionally were problems approached in terms of how they
affected the Federated States of Micronesia as a whole. The twenty-four
amendments finally approved made it through the complex process
largely because they represented no significant threat to any individual
state. Although "unity" was a watchword throughout the convention, it
was more of a shibboleth than an apt characterization of either what was
aspired to or what could be observed in action.
THE PROPOSALS
As the number of proposals steadily grew, one delegate expressed a widely
shared view: "We're not amending the Constitution, we're writing a new
one." Table I categorizes the proposals submitted to the I990 Constitu-
tional Convention.
·Of the I04 amendments proposed, 77 (74 percent) were intended either
primarily or largely to shift power, money, or both from the national gov-
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Table 1. Summary of Delegate Proposals at the 1990 Constitutional Convention
Selection of president and vice president, including specific requirements
for rotation among the states and popular elections~· 13
Technical language changes resulting from the transition from the trustee-
ship to the federation 11
Congress, including increases in number of seats, establishing a bicameral
congress, and term length~· 8
Specific controls over congressional spending* 6
FSM Supreme Court, including term limits and requirements for use of
local precedents* 5
Tighter bureaucratic controls, including public auditor, public service com-
mission, and independent prosecutor~· 4
Requiring FSM citizenship for membership in Presidential Cabinet,
Supreme Court, landownership, and so on 4
Constitutional convention changes 4
Civil rights and legal procedures 3
Other limits on central government, including restatements of revenue
sharing, definitions of concurrent powers, and explicit allocation of
residual powers to the states* 33
Other revenue-sharing proposals* 3
Miscellaneous other proposals, including secession provisions, nuclear-free
provisions, and provisions for establishing a chamber of chiefst 10
Total 104
Notes: *Proposed amendments entirely or significantly concerned with limiting
national government power and/or revenues or enhancing st~te government
power and/or revenues.
tFive of these were entirely or significantly concerned with limiting national gov-
ernment power and/or revenues or enhancing state government power and/ or
revenues.
ernment to the states. When the II technical amendments concerned with
the language of transition from trust territory status and the initial estab-
lishment of the federation are excluded, leaving 93 substantive amend-
men~s, the percentage rises to 83 percent. By a margin of better than four
to one, the work of the convention consisted in finding ways to provide
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the four states with greater control over their national government. I can-
not, in this space, provide an adequate summary of all the proposals. In
what follows, I highlight some of those that were particularly representa-
tive of the convention's mood, distinctly radical in their intent, or that I
think will be especially telling in the long run.
Congressional Allowances
As an indication of the antagonism between the constitutional convention
and the Congress, and of the widely shared feeling that one of the major
purposes of the convention was to curb Congress, the first proposal sub-
mitted was Pohnpei's amendment prohibiting national congresses from
raising their own allowances (ie, any increases could only be for future-
not current-terms). Testimony during the public hearings explains both
why this measure was popular and why, given widespread agreement on
the matter, the proposed amendment was defeated.
The FSM president's "personal representative" explained at a hearing
that "it could be politically difficult, if not impossible, for the President to
veto appropriations for increases in congressional allowances" and that "it
was therefore appropriate for the Convention to decide this issue." He
described how the executive branch's funds had been at times cut as a con-
sequence of its battles with the Congress and that it was "politically not
feasible for the President to veto" budgetary legislation under these cir-
cumstances-"it would be political suicide to do something about these
allowances." The congressional budget officer testified that the proposal
was not strong enough to have the desired effect. "If there is a Constitu-
tional amendment restricting allowances, Congress will find ways to get
around it." He then exhorted the delegates to find a more rigorous means
of preventing abuses. "If you want to do this, do it differently, do it better,
do it stronger."
Members of the committee were strident in their criticisms of these
allowances, calling them "additional, non-taxable salary." One pointed
out that legislators had been using them for nearly everything except the
purposes for which they were originally intended, "including promoting
one's own interests-to get elected, for instance." Delegate Tuuth filed a
minority report calling for more stringent measures, and suggested that
the only truly effective means of halting abuses of congressional financial
powers was to explicitly prohibit all allowances; the legislators would
have to make do with only their salaries. This dissenting opinion split
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what had been a unified position and served, ironically, to dyfeat a mea-
sure on which there had been real accord. When the measure came up for
a vote on first reading, the minority report cast doubt on the proposal's
adequacy; it was received favorably by only half of those voting and was
defeated. A few days later, as the plenary session struggled in its last days
to complete all its tasks, the item was recalled to the floor and the minor-
ity proposal was substituted for the original. It was too little, too late,
however, and in the absence of time for discussion or negotiation the
amended proposal received only 17 of the 24 votes it needed for passage.
The Structure of Congress
A number of proposed amendments dealt with the character of Congress
itself, either modifying the number of delegates to it or reorganizing it as a
bicameral body. Several proposals submitted by Chuukese delegates were
intended, via varying formulas, to increase representation in Congress by
increasing the numbers of delegates. In committee they argued that Con-
gress had become "a small club" desperately in need of new members.
Chuuk's congressional delegation, one continued, was simply too small
and there was therefore no diversity of views within it; it was too easy to
influence; people were not adequately represented because there were too
many people for each representative; not enough time was being given to
each law the Congress had to consider. Another pointed out that the num-
ber of seats in Congress had been determined in 1965 (when the Congress
of Micronesia was first established), and that despite massive population
growth there had been no increase in the number of representatives.
Kosrae's Governor George, on the other hand, expressed his fear that
Micronesia was being "oversaturated with government." The trend at the
convention, he said, is to shift authority and responsibility to the states.
"Why increase the size of the national government?" Resolution of the
issue hinged on the debate-which followed the pattern of so many other
convention debates-between Chuuk's push to give greater weight to pop-
ulation and Kosrae's insistence on retaining state equality at the core of
the nation's political system.
As the related issues of a bicameral congress and direct presidential
elections were interwoven into the debate, the entire project began to fal-
ter. Arguing that the executive branch had lost the ability to control the
direction the national government was taking, the convention president,
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tions given closer consideration. He recommended sending the proposals
back to committee in hopes that it might find a workable compromise.
When his suggestion met with resistance, he responded, "I agree that this
approach is a bit unorthodox, but we may reach a compromise-a bicam-
eral legislature with a popular election for president." He convinced the
committee to make one more attempt to bring before the plenary session a
workable proposal substantially reconstituting the character of the Con-
gress and presidency.
When the committee convened to reconsider the issues, however, noth-
ing had changed. Kosrae and Yap would accept a bicameral congress only
if the upper house were constituted on the basis of state equality and vot-
ing procedures were stiff enough "to protect the smaller states," as one of
them said bluntly. But instituting a bicameral congress would mean that
the system of presidential elections would have to be rewritten in any case
and the only well-regarded proposal was for direct elections, which the
smaller states of course opposed (I discuss the presidential selection system
later). On the final night of the convention, into and past the final hour
(the clock was stopped at ten minutes before midnight until the conven-
tion had completed its work), then, the delegates faced the key questions
of reshaping Congress and the presidency. Despite all of their agreement
on the need for this reshaping, their own local concerns once more pre-
vented them from arriving at a consensus on how to reconstitute the
national government. As Governor George explained, he was happy with
the unicameral system. It provides for shared responsibility, he said. "The
small state has an opportunity to share in the leadership role." But he
opposed a bicameral system: "I'm afraid it will lead to election of the pres-
ident. It could be that one state will be completely left out." Though there
was generally good will toward this proposed transformation of the cen-
tral government, there simply were not enough votes to effect it.
Congressional Allotments
A third set of proposed amendments was intended to address congres-
sional allotments, widely viewed as more attuned to the political needs of
the individual representatives than the development needs of either the
nation or the states. As one rather cynical Pohnpei State bureaucrat
observed, "Is it possible in the system we've learned from Americans to
run a government without a pork barrel? Who's going to run for political
office if they can't use the system to promote their own cause?" When one
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delegate complained that "We don't know where the money's gone,"
another replied, "Don't know or don't want to say?"
Yap's Delegate Tuuth, finance secretary of the central government, sug-
gested that one means of ensuring compliance with development plans
was to specify that appropriations be made only after consultation with
each state's governor, who would also be made the allottee of any funds
appropriated by Congress. A debate ensued about the value of allowing
municipalities to make requests directly to the congressional representa-
tives, without being constrained by the need to gain their governor's
approval. At this point Kosrae's Governor George began to argue that any
direct link between the local municipalities and representatives to the
national government was "an intrusion." The municipalities might like it,
he acknowledged, but it only created confusion and disorganization. All
budgetary planning must go through the governor, he insisted. When it
was suggested that the proposal include wording to the effect that munici-
palities would submit their requests through the governor, Governor
George objected, arguing that it was "overstepping bounds" for the
national constitution to deal with the internal operations of a state.
When the committee took up the question of what types of funds
should be covered by this proposal, it soon became clear that most of
them were thinking in terms of all monies. When one delegate suggested
that the only inherently national tasks-that is, those that merited
national control-were telecommunications, fisheries, and external af-
fairs, another proclaimed, "I don't want the President to be able to stop
anything." Governor George insisted, "We can define a national project.
We can narrow national prerogatives down, I know. If it's in the national
interest to weaken national government in order to make better use of
resources, then that's the way to go." A staff attorney then suggested alter-
native wording that precluded the national government from appropriat-
ing any funds other than those directly requested by the states and every-
one exclaimed, "Right!"
When the proposal was taken up by the plenary council, the lone mem-
ber of the national Congress serving at the convention, Pohnpei's Leo
Falcam, immediately remarked that it had been his experience in Congress
that municipal leaders did not want governors to control all funding. "If
we lump together every state project and have the governor as allottee, we
may be restricting other entities within the state." Chuuk's Delegate Pede-
won argued that the proposed changes would preclude ongoing communi-
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cation between congressional representatives, their constituents, and the
governor. If a governor does not pass on requests from a given area, and
this communication channel has been disrupted, he said, the people will
suffer. (Tensions between municipalities in western Chuuk Lagoon and
the state government were, of course, central to the dynamics of Chuuk's
participation in the constitutional convention.) Governor George re-
sponded, "This proposal is in line with the sovereignty and autonomy of
the states." The proposal failed to pass first reading, and two generally
popular ideas-preventing members of Congress from receiving allot-
ments and ensuring that appropriations were in line with development
plans-were defeated largely because of an attempt to place nearly all
fiscal controls-and thus nearly all power-in the hands of the states'
governors.
The proposal was later recalled and the committee offered an amend-
ment that required allocations to be made in accordance with state law.
Governor Moses, however, was still not persuaded. These problems run
through the entire structure of the FSM government, he argued, and have
as much to do with the power of the Congress over the president as they
do with problems within states. "We must root out this problem alto-
gether," he argued, rather than merely give governors more power within
their respective states. Given that he was influential enough to have been
selected, without formal opposition, to preside over the convention, his
words were heeded, particularly since he, a governor, was opposing
increased powers for governors. The measure was then split into two
parts and sent back to the committee, where two separate proposals were
drafted. The plenary council ultimately passed amendments prohibiting
congressional allotments to members of Congress and specifying that
"Appropriations for public projects be based upon official development
priorities of the recipient governments."
Foreign Investment
Another set of proposals that dealt directly with tensions between the
states and the national government concerned control over foreign invest-
ment and import and export duties. Yap's delegation had introduced a
proposal shifting regulation of foreign commerce from the enumeration
powers held exclusively by the FSM Congress to the constitution's article
enumerating powers held concurrently by both the national and state gov-
ernments. Worried about arguments that this proposal could completely
Jltf .tOOl, '!_~ .'
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paralyze foreign investment in the nation, the Public Finance and Taxa-
tion Committee's chairman then introduced a new proposal that would
limit congressional power over foreign commerce by specifying that
"authority to permit foreign investors to do business in any of the states
shall remain exclusively with each state." By excising the potentially prob~
lematicallanguage, the committee was able to forward to the plenary ses~
sion an important proposal that met with virtually no opposition. Because
no delegation found it threatening-it had no obvious links to issues of
state equality versus demography, for example-it did not meet with even
the minor opposition that worked to scuttle nearly every other proposal
threatening to shift power away from the national government to the
states.
Import Taxes
A second proposal also addressed the quest for local control over commer-
cial activities, as well as dealing with arguments, made repeatedly
throughout the convention, that if the states were to take on increased
responsibilities-as they tried to do with most of the substantive proposals
they introduced-they would need to have a greater share of Micronesia's
revenues. They sought to accomplish this with a proposal that shifted the
right to tax imports and income from the exclusive province of the Con-
gress to a power shared concurrently by the Congress and the states.
Throughout the hearings, representatives of the FSM bureaucracy
worked hard to convince delegates that giving the states a concurrent right
to tax would be a very big mistake. Their arguments fell largely into two
categories. On the one hand, they argued, allowing states to levy taxes
would result in an unbearable tax burden, because the states would
impose too many taxes. On the other, allowing states to tax would
produce deadly competition between states seeking to attract foreign busi-
ness; states that could afford to levy low taxes would lure all the invest-
ment, while poorer states that could not afford to forgo taxes would drive
away business and be that much poorer. "You may be creating a monster,"
warned the congressional budget officer.
Governor George responded with veiled indignation, calling attention
to an assumption that the states would inevitably proceed to overtax.
Throughout the convention he pointed out to national government
bureaucrats their tendency to make predictions based on presumptions
about the states' greediness and incompetence, reminding them that the
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national government had shown itself prone to create precisely the prob-
lems they were attributing to the states.
What were probably the most forceful arguments in favor of state con-
trol over taxation came from a series of Pohnpeian legislators (one of them
a delegate) and bureau heads, who explained during a hearing that taxes
were in fact the states' best means of controlling and stimulating develop-
ment. "Taxes are tools of economic development," one of them declared.
The one FSM department head who favored state taxation, a Pohnpeian
as it happens, observed that "Congress hasn't been responsive to state
needs." Governor George concluded that the current relationship between
the ability to tax and the responsibility to develop was "lopsided." "We
need to reallocate so that the national government doesn't have so much.
There is a need for each state to be able to act on its own needs." In this he
was echoing a sentiment expressed throughout the convention: the states
had most of the responsibility for development, but none of the power to
raise the money necessary to discharge these responsibilities.
As a consequence of arguments it heard in its lengthy public hearings,
the committee substantially rewrote the initial proposal. Rather than
granting states the right to tax concurrently, they left taxation as one of
the powers expressly delegated to Congress and then added, "provided a
state may impose a surtax on any national tax, duty, or tariff based on
imports." Although the states would be provided a new source of revenue,
they would not be free to establish tariffs or levy taxes according to their
own needs. This measure, originally introduced by Kosrae, received the
bare minimum of votes necessary for passage, with the opposition to it
coming from Chuuk. The concerted opposition of the FSM bureaucracy
appears to have convinced enough delegates that it would indeed result in
competition between the states, and the only thing that seemed to trouble
the states more than the national government was the other states.
Maritime Revenues
The attempt to shift power and resources away from the national govern-
ment again encountered stiff opposition when it came to the matter of
dividing up revenues from the nation's waters. Possessing only a few hun-
dred square miles of land set in vast territoral seas, the people of the
nation view the surrounding ocean as a source of potential riches. The
I975 Constitution placed control over those waters with Congress, charg-
ing it in Article IX, Section 2(m) "To regulate the ownership, exploration,
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and exploitation of natural resources within the marine space of the
Federated States of Micronesia beyond 12 miles from island baselines."
Section 6 of the same article states that "Net revenue derived from ocean
floor mineral resources exploited under Section 2(m) shall be divided
equally between the national government and the appropriate state gov-
ernment." One of the first items introduced at the 1990 Constitutional
Convention was the Pohnpei delegation's proposal to alter this division of
revenues, reducing to only 25 percent the amount going to the national
government, with the remainder allocated to "the appropriate state gov-
ernment."
In the public hearings that followed, however, it soon became apparent
that this proposal was not going to generate any income at all for the
states. The head of the national Resources and Development Department
explained that although there had been great expectations for the mining
of ocean-floor minerals when the original constitution was drafted, none
of these projections had been realized. Little technology had been devel-
oped to exploit these resources, and given recent changes in global poli-
tics, which have been opening access to formerly restricted sources of the
relevant minerals, it is not likely that much relevant technological devel-
opment will occur in the near future.
The proposal provoked the same opposition that had been marshalled
against nearly every other proposal the central government's bureaucrats
found threatening, and when committee members took it up they had to
confront the likelihood that it was not going to raise any money for the
states. Even if there were any money, one delegate insisted, the national
government would not pass it on to the states. The states need to "be in
position to demand it." Another delegate then suggested a major change,
calling instead for inclusion of a percentage of all marine resource reve-
nues. The idea was clearly popular, though no immediate decision was
made. Discussion then turned to a second element of the problem: should
the funds thus generated be divided equally among all the states or allo-
cated to the state from whose waters the resources were harvested? What
if, for example, Pohnpeians caught fish in Chuuk's waters? "If the fish
move from one state to another while they're being caught, whose are
they?"
The proposal the committee finally sent on to the plenary session
included both the ocean floor mineral resources specified in the original
constitution and "living marine resources" in the revenue sharing, and spe-
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cified a division providing "not less than 50 percent of all net revenue" to
the states. It did not specify how the states' shares should be allocated,
leaving this up to a later "division agreed to by the states, for state devel-
opment programs." The committee's report asserted that "these resources
originally belonged to the states and the Committee wishes to emphasize,
still belong to the states." Speaking to the plenary session on behalf of this
proposal, Governor George said that in the beginning there had been no
Federated States of Micronesia. Then the states came together to form
the federation. The states, he insisted, therefore existed prior to the
federation.
Several delegates objected to the absence of any reference to municipal
governments. One of Yap's delegates asked if the states had the flexibility
to give the revenues to a municipality if a state recognized traditional own-
ership of marine resources. 7 The issue of how the revenue might be
divided up was a sensitive one that some of the delegates did not wish to
assign to another body. The committee report was sent back to commit-
tee, where the explicit reference to living marine resources was struck out
and replaced by a simple reference to "Section 2(m)." This action assured
that on the ballot that would go before the voters for ratification, there
was no mention of the real change entailed-that fishing royalties, which
had hitherto been entirely directed to the national government, would
henceforth be shared with the states. It also restored a key passage from
the original article that had been struck out along the way: the committee
decided that these revenues would be divided "between the national gov-
ernment and the appropriate state government."
The amended proposal did not appear nearly as radical as it in fact was.
It not only shifted half of all fishing royalties to the states, but in doing so
declared that fish and the royalties they produced were inherently assets of
the states-that the nation's waters were state waters before they were
national waters, a point the committee reiterated in its minutes. When the
proposal once again came before the plenary council, it received exactly
the twenty-four votes it required and was approved. Opposition to it came
largely from Chuuk delegates, for whom the issue was highly problematic.
Not only would it reduce the nation's common pool of funding by a stag-
gering amount, but it was clearly a major gain for the state equality posi-
tion, dividing, as it did, the nation's waters among the states, without ref-
erence to the issue of population size or needs. As finally adopted, the
proposal was among the more significant changes approved by the I990
Constitutional Convention.
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TENSIONS AMONG THE STATES
Although the delegates generally agreed that their task was to shift power
and revenue away from the national government, they could reach no
consensus on how to reconstitute the Federated States of Micronesia. The
question of whether to divide the power of the purse strings equally
among the four states or distribute it according to population size loomed
as the prime impediment. As Denis de Rougemont (1941) long ago pointed
out, federations are likely to be successful only as long as no single mem-
ber is significantly larger or more powerful than the others. If more power
were shifted to the states, and then allocated on the basis of population,
Chuuk stood to take a dominant-perhaps overwhelming-position
within the federation, while Kosrae would become increasingly margina-
lized. That so few changes-of the large number of radical proposals ini-
tially introduced-came out of the convention may be attributed largely to
this conflict. In American political history (which is relevant here because
the federation's constitutional system is largely patterned after that of the
United States, unlike the Westminster system more widely used in the
Pacific), this sort of opposition between "states" is usually spoken of as
"sectional," but in the Micronesian case I think it is more aptly termed
"ethnic." Although the peoples of Micronesia's many islands and island
groups have always traded and intermarried with one another, their
societies have been developing there for at least two thousand years, and
they tend to view themselves in terms of what scholars call distinct ethnic
identities. As one delegate had stated at the beginning of the convention,
"We are different peoples, speaking different languages, with different
cultures."
As already noted, the constitutional convention was made up of four
distinct state delegations, not thirty-one Micronesian delegates. Although
many of the proposals had as their immediate rationale the weakening of
central government, many others were plainly intended to rearrange polit-
ical relations among the states.
Presidential Selection
Finding an acceptable method of selecting a president has been a persisting
problem for the Micronesians. The nation employs a hybrid system to
choose its chief executive. Though the Congress has only a single house,
each state delegation includes both senators elected from population-
apportioned districts for two-year terms and a single at-large senator
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elected for a four-year term. From among the four at-large, four-year sen-
ators, Congress itself selects a president and vice president (who are then
replaced in by-elections). The general understanding in the country has
been that the presidency should rotate among the states, but this is not a
matter of law. There was also a sense that after Chuuk's Toshiwo Naka-
yama served the first two terms, Pohnpei's four-year senator would be
chosen as the second president. For reasons too complex to detail here,
this did not come to pass; Yap's John Haglelegam was chosen, to Pohn-
pei's considerable dissatisfaction and a widespread assumption that
Chuuk's congressional delegation had engineered the switch. Though the
so-called gentleman's agreement concerning rotation had not been ex-
pressly broken, it had been made clear that the large Chuukese congres-
sional delegation possessed enough power to control the office, and the
question of selecting future presidents became a burning national ques-
tion. General agreement existed that some form of guaranteed rotation
among the states was critical to the survival of the federation, but dis-
agreement about other aspects of the selection process (manifested in the
thirteen different proposals concerning it) kept the delegates from finding
common ground.
As with so many other issues, the problem of revising the presidential
selection process foundered on the fundamental opposition between pop-
ulation size and state sovereignty. Some felt that power over the process
was best removed from Congress by giving it to the people through a sim-
ple popular vote. Several Chuukese delegates, however, saw their own
state's size and consequent power as possibly the greatest threat to the
nation's continued union, and they sought to limit this imbalance and its
potential for disruption by proposing a complex formula. This provided
for a popular election employing a proportional weighting of votes, which
would give each state an equal say in determining the outcome. The com-
plex formula they devised, well meaning though it was, received almost
no attention.
Ultimately, attempts to resolve the presidential issue foundered on a
lack of trust. The degree of suspicion among the states was perhaps as
great as their shared distrust of the national government. The delegates
were confounded by what I have already described as one of the conven-
tion's inherent dilemmas: it was feared that any attempt to weaken the
central government as a means of enhancing the power of the states was
likely to result in an equally problematic situation in which the differential
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sizes and strengths of the states would allow one or two states to dominate
the federation at the expense of the others. Such a solution would have
merely replicated-rather than remedied-the problem the delegates had
set out to resolve. The Chuukese delegates' repeated references to popula-
tion equality and Kosrae's preoccupation with state sovereignty made
everyone conscious not only of the opposition between them but of the
improbability of achieving a resolution agreeable to both.
Secession
Though the proposed amendment permitting secession played a seemingly
marginal role in the convention's deliberations, it is instructive to consider
its import for questions of Micronesian unity and sectionalism. Given
questions about the nation's political status, this issue is particularly trou-
blesome to the people of Pohnpei, who have long been committed to an
independent Micronesia. When the secession proposal was briefly taken
up in committee, Asterio Takesy, FSM acting secretary of external affairs
and a convention delegate, opposed it on grounds that it would make the
nation appear unstable and therefore drive away potential investors.
Moreover, he continued, the US government would be inclined to view
such a measure as a threat to the Federated States of Micronesia's security
agreements with the United States under the Compact of Free Association,
and if it were enacted he would immediately be called in by the United
States for consultations and instructions. At this point one of the constitu-
tional convention's most influential delegates, former FSM President
Tosiwo Nakayama asked, "Why do we need this in the Constitution?" A
Pohnpeian delegate replied, "Our people asked for it." Nakayama re-
sponded, "In other words, there are people here in Pohnpei who would
like to secede?" Came the reply, "All of them." The proposal received little
support and died in committee.
External Relations
Both Yap and Pohnpei introduced proposals intended to further restrict
the right of foreign powers (ie, the United States) to bring hazardous
materials and weapons into the Federated States of Micronesia. The origi-
nal constitution prohibits testing, storage, use, or disposal of "radioactive,
toxic chemical, or other harmful substances" within the country "without
the express approval of the national government." Like many of the other
proposals' Pohnpei introduced, this one was intended to transfer a degree
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of decision-making authority to the states by requiring that express
approval of the relevant state also be granted. Yap's proposal simply
deleted the qualifying clause "without express approval of the national
government," leaving the remainder of the original article to specify cate-
gorically that these materials not be introduced.
The issue provoked one of the constitutional convention's more sensi-
tive discussions. The Compact of Free Association, which the FSM consti-
tution specifies is subordinate to itself, grants the United States authority
to determine how best to provide for the federation's security and thereby
perpetuates effective American control over the islands. In the course of
several meetings of the General Provisions Committee, the FSM Depart-
ment of External Affairs found itself explaining that any act the United
States might construe as movement in the direction of an alignment with
the Nuclear-Free Pacific movement would immediately elicit an American
demand for discussions, at which the federation would be informed that it
was in violation of the compact and therefore in danger of losing the fund-
ing the agreement secures (ie, the source of most of its income).
In dealing with this issue, the committee was forced to confront one of
the constitutional convention's generally unspoken subtexts: the complex
web of control the United States retains over Micronesia. The compact
provides the United States with a formal right to interfere in Micronesian
affairs in the name of security.8 But beyond this right to intrude, the
United States has the capacity to cut off the compact funding, citing non-
compliance, and thereby bring the entire country to a halt. Through a
process arranged and managed by the Merrill Lynch investment firm, the
Federated States of Micronesia has issued bonds that provide it with funds
now, in exchange for guarantees underwritten by later compact payments.
Some Micronesian leaders argue that Merrill Lynch uses its fiduciary role
to dictate policy to the national government. One member of the commit-
tee explicitly cited this arrangement, reminding the other delegates that
when he had worked on the bond issue a question had been raised about
how secure the payments would be under the compact. The rating of the
bonds, he explained, had been affected by the ability of the United States
to cut off the funds if the terms of the compact are breached. A number of
committee members accepted this state of affairs with apparent equanim-
ity, and the chairman quickly tabled the two antinuclear proposals perma-
nently. This action troubled Pohnpei's representatives on the committee;
they asked to have at least one of the proposals reported back to the
plenary session, even if it did not carry a favorable recommendation. The
i,
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chairman responded, "We're aware of the reasons we're tabling this in
committee. We don't want to broadcast them."
Much of the Micronesians' dislike of big government-one of the fears
that drove the convention-derives from the national government's ability
(if not responsibility) to implement US policy. This episode provided dele-
gates with a perfect example of how US policies get implemented by
default. The committee chairman demonstrated precisely the ill-use of
authority the Pohnpeians had come hoping to eliminate.
Sovereignty
In a similar vein, another unsuccessful proposal was meant to convince
foreign governments that the trusteeship agreement was no longer in
effect. 9 Senator Falcam wanted to amend the language of the constitu-
tion's article on status transition in order to make it clear that "we are a
sovereign nation, with the exception of powers that we voluntarily assign
to other nations to take care of. If we don't do this, it may call into ques-
tion our sovereignty. It may affect powers of the national government and
states with respect to the U.S. It is a step declaring that the Trusteeship
Agreement is terminated and that the FSM is a sovereign and independent
nation." Other members of the committee, however, argued that the
Federated States of Micronesia is not an independent nation, and the pro-
posal was dropped. 10 Committee discussions of the last two proposals
provide evidence of both the ambiguous nature of the free association
relationship with the United States and the delegates' ambivalent feelings
about this ambiguity. For some it appears to be convenient and unproble-
matic; for others it is profoundly disturbing.
Chamber ofChiefs
One of the constitutional convention's more controversial proposals was
to establish an FSM Chamber of Chiefs, an episode I have discussed in
detail elsewhere (Petersen nd). Kosraens, who no longer have chiefs, reso-
lutely opposed the measure, but it was also called into question by several
other delegates. One worried about the effects of codifying customary
leadership: "We may unwittingly be putting limits on our traditional lead-
ers' authority." Another argued that the states were the more appropriate
place for such bodies, "because no two states have the same customs and
traditions. There are subtle differences." The biggest problem, however,
was paradoxical. The general sense was that if the chamber's rights and
duties were not spelled out clearly, Congress would thwart the conven-
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tion's intentions by legislating a subordinate role for the chiefs. But agree-
ment was also widespread that no one-neither the constitutional conven-
tion nor the Congress-could tell the chiefs what to do.
Eventually, three of the convention's most influential delegates took
charge of the proposal and worked skillfully to resolve resistance to it.
This was the only occasion on which I saw parliamentary skills openly
brought to bear as a means of solving an otherwise intractable problem,
and was evidence of the proposal's significance. The delegates managed to
draft phrasing that was simultaneously vague enough to assure that the
chiefs themselves would be able to determine the chamber's official role
and specific enough to overcome fears that Congress would exercise
power over it. By combining a number of different amendments and
drafts, they established that its primary role would be "to advise on mat-
ters of customs and traditions, to promote and protect customs and tradi-
tions, and to promote peace and unity." The role of the national govern-
ment-the Congress of Micronesia-in creating the chamber would be to
"take every step necessary and reasonable to provide" for the chamber's
operations.
Ratification
The final proposal submitted to the I990 Constitutional Convention had
the potential to effect greater changes in the Federated States of Microne-
sia than any other proposal considered, because it was meant to make
final ratification of all the other proposed amendments considerably less
difficult. The I975 Constitution requires that constitutional amendments
be "approved by three-quarters of the votes cast in each of three-quarters
of the states." This proposal amended that figure to a simple majority vote
in three-quarters of the states. As finally modified, the amendment also
specified that this change would become effective on 3 November I990;
given that the constitutional referendum could not possibly be held until
some time in I99I, the I990 date meant that the change would be retroac-
tive, and the new ratification requirement would apply to the referendum
itself.
The proposal came in response to the sense, widely shared among the
delegates, that gaining the approval of three-quarters of the voters in three
states would be nearly impossible and that the convention was therefore a
largely futile effort. Yap's Robert Ruecho' argued that the requirements
for ratification were almost impossible to satisfy. "It would mean," he
argued, "that having a ConCon every ten years is a waste of time." Two
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Kosraen delegates, in keeping with the position they had enunciated
throughout the convention-that is, defending the sovereignty of the
states, maintaining that none should be required to acquiesce to changes
with which they disagreed, and calling instead for consensus-voted
against the proposal. It passed 24-2, and thus raised the possibility that
the convention's work might ultimately be sanctioned by the voters.
Indeed, had forty-nine Kosraens cast their ballots differently on this one
item, the outcome of the entire convention would have been far different.
THE RATIFYING REFERENDUM
The twenty-four proposed amendments approved by the convention, plus
two added by the Congress of Micronesia, were presented to voters
in a constitutional referendum on 2 July 1991. The national government
mounted an educational program in order to help voters understand the
implications of the proposed changes. This program, unlike those that
have preceded important referendums in the past, was decidedly neutral in
content. With few exceptions, the proposals had to have been relatively
neutral in order to have made it through the constitutional convention.
The most potent item on the ballot-the final amendment lowering the
ratification requirement from a three-quarters majority to a simple major-
ity in three states-was approved in Yap and Pohnpei, but fell a few votes
short of 75 percent in Kosrae. As the delegates had foreseen, their work
was nearly all for naught. Ultimately, only four amendments were
approved by the voters.
None of the proposals finally ratified had much to do with tensions
among the states. Rather, all four were products of the convention's other
key theme, the states' shared antagonism toward the national govern-
ment. The first change effected was that the power of Congress to define
"major" crimes was limited to control over "national" crimes; that is, the
charge is now defined by the nature of the crime, not the severity of the
sanctions to be imposed. Second, courts are now required to use Microne-
sian precedents before turning to American law. Third, the prohibition
against indefinite land-use agreements is now limited to noncitizens and
governments. And fourth, the national government's role in education
and health issues was redefined, so that it is no longer a concurrent power,
and its responsibilities in these areas are now enumerated.
Voting patterns among the states were highly varied, reflecting some of
the same outlooks manifested at the convention. In Kosrae, every pro-
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posed amendment was approved by at least 50 percent of the voters, but
only four items received approval by 75 percent or more. In Chuuk, only
two amendments were favored by as many as 50 percent of the voters (53
and 54 percent, respectively). In Pohnpei, only four proposed amendments
received less than 75 percent approval (and one of these received 74 per-
cent); and in Yap, only three proposals received less than 75 percent of the
votes. The Kosraen and Chuukese votes clearly reflected their delegates'
views that any change from the status quo could only hurt them.
CONCLUSION
The Federated States of Micronesia Constitutional Convention of 1990
ended much as it began. In coming to the convention the delegates
brought with them a shared sense that "We don't need two drivers any-
more." Everyone was eager to see political, economic, and social responsi-
bilities-and the funding to discharge them-transferred from the central
government to the states. But tensions among the states nearly paralyzed
the entire convention. Most states seemed convinced that change would
work against them. No resolution to the dilemma, nor any sort of com-
promise, was achieved.
The convention served largely to further heighten tensions within the
federation, both between the states and the federal government and
among the states themselves. In time, I believe, unhappiness with the cen-
tral government, which has been growing steadily since its inception, will
result in a concerted effort, quite possibly accompanied by some violence,
to wrest power from it. When this happens, however, relations among the
states themselves will have so deteriorated that no new accommodation
among them will be found.
When the current Compact of Free Association with the United States
expires in 2001, the Federated States of Micronesia may well disintegrate
into a series of microstates, even smaller than their present aggregate pop-
ulation of just over one hundred thousand. Most likely the early twenty-
first century will see a series of political entities forming in Micronesia on
the scale of Tuvalu, Tokelau, or even Niue. Kiribati, Belau, and the
Marshall Islands will be representative of the rest of Micronesia. Such fis-
sion goes quite against the grain of twentieth-century political thought,
conditioned as it has been by the sheer size of a handful of superpowers.
But changes in technology may make it possible for statelets to coexist
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with giants, even if the quest for power makes it unlikely. The historical
trajectory of colonialism, which once strung these islands together like so
many gems on an empress's necklace, has passed its apogee; the golden
chain has snapped and the stones scatter.
* * *
A GRANT FROM THE Faculty Research Program of the City University of New
York underwrote my travel to the Federated States of Micronesia in I990. The
delegates and staff of the I990 Constitutional Convention were consistently help-
ful, allowing me access to every facet of the convention; I could never have done
this work without their generous cooperation. Eve Pinsker rendered me invalu-
able research assistance. My wife, Victoria Garcia Petersen, shared her expertise
in political theory with me and, along with our daughter Grace, put up with the
infelicities of fieldwork while I tried to complete too many projects simultane-
ously.
I present and analyze aspects of this material in much greater depth elsewhere
(Petersen I993 a).
Notes
I Although stenographers recorded the plenary sessions and made preliminary
journals available from its early days, no official journal has ever appeared. I
made my own handwritten, verbatim notes at plenary sessions, public hearings,
committee meetings, and on other relevant occasions; all quotations appearing
here are from these notes.
2 Reports of votes at the United Nations commonly refer to the federation as
"Micronesia."
3 Kosrae had been a part of Pohnpei District until shortly before it became the
fourth state of the federation.
4 The legal status of the free association agreements was not entirely clear
until the United Nations Security Council approved termination of the trusteeship
in the Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Federated States in December 1990,
shortly after the United States granted the then Soviet Union more than a billion
dollars worth of food credits.
5 The 1990 census figures for the Federated States of Micronesia, as reported
to the convention delegates, are: Chuuk 54,796; Pohnpei 33,263; Yap 10,782;
Kosrae 7.39°; total 106,231.
6 A,majority of Pohnpeians voted for independence in the 1975 Referendum
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on Future Political Status, and in 1983 a majority voted against the Compact of
Free Association, calling instead for independence (Petersen 1979; 1985).
7 Questions about traditional ownership of submerged reefs and other marine
resources are particularly important in Yap State, where people on the atolls, who
are only partly integrated into the society and culture of the big island, are dubi-
ous about surrendering authority over these resources to the state government. I
thank William Alkire for clarifying these matters for me.
8 In the course of hearings in the US Senate, it was made clear that the US gov-
ernment believes that it retains "full plenary power" over the Micronesians (US
Senate 1984, 167).
9 Dealings with the European Community were cited explicitly as having been
complicated by the ambiguities of the federation's political status.
10 I deal elsewhere in some detail with these disagreements over the Federated
States of Micronesia's legal status (Petersen 1993b).
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Abstract
The Federated States of Micronesia's Constitutional Convention, held in 1990,
served as a focus for a variety of discontents. Structural and ethnic tensions
among the states of the federation, and between the states and the central govern-
ment, were the most immediate sources of the 104 amendments proposed to the
convention, but the original (1975) Micronesian Constitutional Convention's
inability to define either the federation's future political relationship with the
United States or the degree of power to be vested in its central government also
loomed large as sources of discontent. The vast majority of the proposed amend-
ments were intended to shift power or funds, or both, from the central govern-
ment to the states, but delegates to the 1990 convention participated almost
entirely as representatives of their respective states, rather than on behalf of the
nation-state as a whole, and competing sectional interests kept them from achiev-
ing any significant agreement. Only four amendments were ultimately approved
in the general referendum. Despite this apparent lack of movement toward signif-
icant change, the history of the 1990 convention suggests that the Federated States
of Micronesia is troubled by an array of fracture lines and will find itself con-
fronted with increasing stresses as it approaches the end of its Compact of Free
Association with the United States in 2001.
